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Abstract.	  This	  study	  has	  undertaken	  a	  comprehensive	  empirical	  analysis	  of	  the	  wealth	  
effects	  of	  bank	  M&As	  in	  Greece	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐‑2013.	  The	  purpose	  is	  to	  measure	  
the	  performance	  of	  merger	  participants	  over	  the	  acquisition	  period	  as	  a	  deviation	  of	  
 ǯ         
particular	   process	   of	   M&A.	   The	   authors	   develop	   a	   conceptual	   framework	   that	  
integrates	   theoretical	   perspectives	   from	   economics,	   finance,	   organization	   theory,	  
strategic	  management	  and	  human	  resource	  management	  to	  offer	  a	  broader	  process-­‐‑
oriented	  integrative	  model	  of	  the	  empirical	  evidence	  and	  theories	  suggested	  to	  explain	  
acquisitions.	  The	  empirical	  analysis	  reports	  insignificant	  abnormal	  gains	  for	  acquiring	  
banks,	  significant	  positive	  abnormal	  returns	  at	  7,44%	  for	  acquired	  banks,	  and	  2,91%	  
positive	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  the	  combined	  entity,	  in	  the	  event	  window	  [-­‐‑10;+1].	  The	  
findings	  indicate	  that,	  on	  average,	  the	  Greek	  bank	  mergers	  neither	  create	  nor	  destroy	  
shareholder	  wealth.	   This	   result	   is	   consistent	  with	   the	   findings	   of	   other	  Greek	   event	  
studies	   and	   the	   bulk	   of	   US	   and	   European	   event	   studies	   on	  M&A	  wealth	   effects.	   On	  
average,	   acquired	   firm	   shareholders	   gain	  at	   the	   expense	   of	   the	  acquiring	   firm	  and	  
market	  value	  of	  the	  combined	  entity	  appears	  to	  have	  little	  improvement	  around	  the	  
announcement	  of	  the	  transaction.	  The	  conceptual	  framework	  explicitly	  describes	  that	  
wealth	  effects	  of	  bank	  M&As	  in	  Greece	  over	  the	  period	  1996-­‐‑2013	  may	  be	  a	  result	  of	  
macroeconomic	  theory	  and	  perfectly	  competitive	  market,	  lack	  of	  strategic	  relatedness	  
and	  synergy	  realization,	  managerial	  hubris,	  or	  unethical	  behavior	  of	  managers	  derived	  
from	  expense	  preference	  approach	  of	  agency	  theory.	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318	  |	  Anastasios	  KARAMANOS,	  George	  BAKATSELOS,	  Roena	  AGOLLI	  Abnormal	  Stock	  Market	  Returns	  to	  Announcements	  of	  M&A	  Banking	  Deals	  In	  Greece	  1996-­‐‑2013	  
	   	  
Introduction	  	  Deregulation,	   globalization,	   advances	   in	   transaction	   and	   information	  technologies	   (technological	   progress),	   geographic	   shifts	   in	   growth	  opportunities,	   diversification	   of	   risks,	   economies	   of	   scale	   and	   scope,	   cost	  reduction,	  financial	  synergies,	  tax	  advantages,	  the	  introduction	  of	  the	  euro	  and	  increased	  competition	  as	  well	  as,	  technological	  progress,	  fast	  expansion	  of	   client	   requirements,	   risk	   diversification,	   regulatory	   policy,	   managerial	  hubris	   have	   all	   been	   broad	   well-­‐‑known	   drivers	   for	   consolidation	   in	   the	  banking	  sector	  (Amel	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Ayadi,	  2007;	  Beitel	  et	  al.,	  2004;	  Campa	  &	  Hernando,	  2005;	  Chen	  et	  al.,	  2006;	  DeYoung	  et	  al.,	  2009;	  Demsetz	  &	  Strahan,	  2007;	  Focarelli	  &	  Pozzolo,	  2010;	  Hannan	  &	  Pillof,	  2009;	  Hendricks,	  2007).	  
     Ƭ     ǯefficiency	  and	  profitability	  has	  not	  yet	  been	  convincingly	  answered	   in	   the	  academic	   literature	   given	   the	   restricted	   consensus	   on	   the	   impact	   of	  
ǯǤUp	  to	  the	  present,	  the	  Greek	  banking	  sector	  has	  not	  been	  studied	  adequately	  due	  to	  data	  deficiencies	  (Pasiouras	  &	  Zopounidis,	  2008).	  This	  paper	  thus	  fills	  this	  research	  gap.	  	  	  It	  reviews	  the	  rationale	  behind	  banking	  consolidation	  in	  Greece	  and	  it	  uses	  market	   data	   to	   perform	   an	   event	   study	   on	   the	   stock	  market	   valuation	   of	  M&As	  in	  the	  Greek	  banking	  sector	  for	  1996-­‐‑2013.	  Therefore,	  the	  research	  hypothesis	   can	   be	   formulated	   as	   follows:	   A	   bank	   M&A	   has	   a	   significant	  
positive	  impact	  on	  the	  stock	  market	  price	  of	  both	  the	  acquirer	  and	  the	  target.	  	  
	  
	  
Literature	  review	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  bank	  M&As	  
	  
Theoretical	  perspectives	  
	  The	   banking	   literature	   postulates	   four	   rationales	   on	   why	   banks	   have	  experienced	  an	  unprecedented	  wave	  of	  M&As	  in	  the	  recent	  years.	  One	  of	  the	  most	  important	  rationales	  is	  that	  through	  M&As	  banks	  can	  attain	  operating	  synergies	   and	   efficiency.	   The	   other	   three	   rationales	   are	   not	   justified	   on	  operating	  efficiency	  grounds.	  The	   first	   is	   related	  with	  management-­‐‑utility	  maximization	  theory	  and	  the	  other	  two	  have	  to	  do	  with	  market	  power	  and	  too-­‐‑big-­‐‑to-­‐‑fail	   (TBTF)	   motives	   (Rezitis,	   2008).	   Management-­‐‑utility	  maximization	  theory	  claims	  that	  managers	  tend	  to	  increase	  the	  size	  of	  banks	  through	  M&As	  in	  order	  to	  affect	  their	  own	  perquisites,	  power	  and	  prestige	  (Amel	   et	   al.,	   2004).	   Likewise,	   banks	   might	   pursue	   an	   M&A	   in	   order	   to	  increase	  the	  market	  power.	  Boot	  and	  Thankor	  (2000)	  consider	  the	  banking	  industry	   as	   imperfectly	   competitive	   and	  suggests	   that	  prices	   and	  product	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behavior	  relate	  with	  the	  degree	  of	  market	  power	  or	  market	  concentration.	  Consolidation	  allows	  banks	  to	  obtain	  market	  power	  and	  take	  advantage	  of	  quasi-­‐‑monopolistic	   or	   oligopolistic	   returns.	   De	   Guevara	   (2005)	   provides	  evidence	  that	  the	  motive	  of	  market	  power	  in	  M&As	  can	  better	  characterize	  the	  European	  banking	  system	  since	  it	  is	  organized	  as	  a	  system	  of	  national	  oligopoly.	   Furthermore,	   as	   the	   size	  of	   a	   bank	   increases	   the	   too-­‐‑big-­‐‑to-­‐‑fail	  argument	  comes	  into	  effect.	  Certainly,	  the	  failure	  of	  major	  banks	  can	  cause	  undesirables	  systematic	  consequences	  and	  large	  banks,	  which	  are	  often	  put	  together	   by	   a	   string	   of	  mergers,	   are	   virtually	   certain	   to	   be	   bailed	   out	   by	  taxpayers	  (Walter,	  2003).	  	  	  However,	   the	   economic	   and	   strategic	   managerial	   assumptions	   of	   the	  aforementioned	   rationales	  may	  not	   be	   sufficient	   for	   the	   acquirer	   and	   the	  target	  to	  create	  shareholder	  value.	  Several	  scenarios	  are	  noticed.	  Whether	  a	  bank	   M&A	   induces	   permanent	   improvement	   in	   the	   wealth	   of	   the	  stockholders	   of	   the	   acquiring	   and	   the	   acquired	   bank	   is	   an	   issue	   of	   plain	  contradiction	   between	   existing	   business	   procedures	   and	   traditional	  macroeconomic	  theory	  (Shimizu	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  From	  a	  business	  perspective,	  M&As	  are	  unequivocally	  seen	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  generating	  means	  towards	  inorganic	   growth	   (Bertoncelj	   &	   Kovaj,	   2007).	   However,	   macroeconomic	  theory,	  which	  considers	  the	  market	  to	  be	  perfectly	  competitive	  (Mandekler,	  1997),	  suggests	  that	  shareholders	  of	  bidders	  in	  M&As	  cannot	  benefit	  from	  abnormal	  returns	  (Lubatkin,	  1983).	  According	  to	  Fama	  (1970),	  if	  the	  value	  of	   the	   incremental	   cash	   flow	   generated	   by	   the	   combination	   of	   operating	  activities	  of	   the	  bidder	  and	   target	   is	  publicly	  known,	   if	  numerous	  bidding	  banks	   can	   all	   gain	   this	   cash	   flow,	   and	   if	   semi-­‐‑strong	   market	   efficiency	  prevails,	  i.e.	  stock	  prices	  reflect	  all	  public	  information,	  including	  market	  and	  non-­‐‑market	  information,	  then	  the	  stockholders	  of	  the	  bidders,	  will,	  at	  best,	  earn	  only	  normal	  returns.	  	  	  In	   this	   setting,	   takeovers	   may	   materialize	   into	   economic	   value	   but	   this	  economic	   value	  will	   be	   allocated	   in	   the	   form	   of	   abnormal	   returns	   to	   the	  stockholders	   of	   the	   target	   firm.	   According	   to	   the	   notion	   of	   perfectly	  competitive	  market,	  at	  the	  time	  of	  an	  M&A,	  the	  price	  of	  the	  target	  firm	  will	  rapidly	   raise	   as	   the	   competition	  will	   identify	   the	   one-­‐‑off	   resources	   of	   the	  target	  firm,	  and	  seeing	  an	  opportunity	  for	  abnormal	  returns,	   it	  will	  bid	  up	  the	  stock	  price	  of	  the	  firm	  soon	  to	  be	  acquired,	  until	  all	  the	  incremental	  cash	  flow	  of	  the	  merger	  or	  acquisition	  goes	  to	  the	  shareholders	  of	  the	  target	  firm	  (Jensen	   &	   Ruback,	   1983).	   This	   rationale	   arises	   from	   the	   equilibrium	  anticipated	   in	   perfectly	   competitive	  markets,	   in	   this	   case,	   the	  market	   for	  corporate	  control	  (Hirshleifer,	  2005).	  	  An	   emerging	   body	   of	   literature	   about	  mergers	   and	   acquisitions	   offers	   an	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  intermediate	  ground	  between	  existing	  business	  procedures	  and	  traditional	  macroeconomic	  theory.	  The	  most	  important	  concept	  from	  this	  literature	  is	  
   Ǯ  ǯ  it	   is	   particularly	  important	   in	   understanding	   the	   performance	   of	   M&As	   (Sunaramurthy,	  2000).	  The	  framework	  is	  adopted	  from	  earlier	  diversification	  contingency	  frameworks	   (e.g.,	   Rumelt,	   1974;	   Christenberg	   &	  Montgomery,	   1981)	   and	  recast	  the	  issue	  on	  when	  rather	  than	  on	  whether	  M&As	  can	  create	  or	  enhance	  shareholder	  value	  (Sundaramurthy,	  2000).	  Assuming	  that	  acquiring	  banks	  are	  governed	  by	   rational	  executives	  who	  consider	  mergers	  as	  a	  means	   to	  
ǯǡngency	  framework	  predicts	   that	  abnormal	   returns	  of	   the	  acquirer	   are	   contingent	  upon	  the	  ǯǡthe	  growth	  rate	  of	  its	  markets,	  and	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  these	  two	  components	  arrive	  at	  a	  cogent	  and	  strategic	  fit	  with	  the	  competitive	  strengths	  and	  market	  growth	  rates	  of	  the	  target.	  The	  merger	   contingency	   framework	   claims	   that	   the	   better	   the	   strategic	  relatedness	  between	  the	  acquiring	  and	  the	  acquired	  bank,	   the	  greater	   the	  shareholder	  value	  created	  from	  M&As	  (Lubatkin,	  1983).	  However,	  Barney	  (1988)	  shows	   that	  only	   if	   the	  market	   for	   corporate	   control	   is	   imperfectly	  competitive	  then	  the	  shareholders	  of	  acquiring	  banks	  may	  achieve	  abnormal	  returns.	  	  Nonetheless,	  the	  executives	  of	  acquiring	  banks	  are	  not	  always	  rational.	  It	  is	  not	  surprising	  that	  managers	  use	  mergers	  to	  acquire	  control	  of	  large	  banks	  since	   the	  benefits	   rendered	  by	   the	   increased	   jurisdiction	  are	   the	   same	  as	  those	   of	   a	   promotion	   (Cartwright	   &	   Schoenberg,	   2006).	   The	   concept	   of	  
Ǯ  ǯ,	   derived	   from	   agency	   theory,	   explains	   the	  continuously	  deteriorating	  business	  ethics	  among	  managers.	  Increased	  firm	  and	   staff	   size	   results	   in	   higher	   salaries	   and	   discretionary	   income	   for	  managers.	   Such	   income	   is	   preferred,	   as	   it	   is	   not	   typically	   taxed	   as	  conventional	  income	  (Achampong	  &	  Zemedkun,	  1995).	  On	  average,	  manager	  unethical	   behavior	   can	   erode	   shareholder	   value	   (Liargovas	   &	   Repousis,	  2011).	  	  	  The	  fact	  that	  returns	  to	  mergers	  and	  their	  allocation	  between	  the	  acquiring	  and	  acquired	  banks	  may	  be	  driven	  by	  self-­‐‑interest	  of	  the	  acquiring	  managers	  is	  not	  the	  only	  fact	  that	  cast	  doubt	  on	  the	  professional	  standards	  of	  decision-­‐‑makers.	   In	   the	   finance	   literature,	   there	   is	   evidence	   that	  mergers	  may	   be	  driven	  by	  the	  bogus	  confidence	  of	  the	  acquiring	  manger	  (Malmendier	  &	  Tate,	  2003;	   Dagnino	   et	   al.,	   2014).	   This	   scenario	   is	   unrelated	   with	   the	  aforementioned	   Ǯexpense	   preference	   approachǯ	   of	   agency	   theory.	   Roll	  (1986)	  is	  the	  first	  to	  introduce	  the	  overconfidence	  hypothesis	  Ǯǯof	  corporate	   takeovers.	   Overconfident	   managers	   tend	   to	   overestimate	   the	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returns	  the	  acquirer	  can	  obtain	  from	  the	  merger	  and	  overbid	  for	  the	  target	  company.	  Hubris	  is	  empirically	  associated	  with	  a	  significant	  probability	  of	  negative	  or	  insignificant	  abnormal	  returns	  (Aktas	  et	  al.,	  2007).	  	  
	  
Empirical	  groundwork	  
	  Research	  literature	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  consolidation	  can	  be	  classified:	  dynamic	  efficiency	   studies,	   operating	   performance	   studies	   and	   event	   studies.	   This	  paper	   follows	   the	   event	   study	   approach.	   The	   approach	   is	   based	   on	   the	  proposition	   that	   in	   an	   efficient	   market	   the	   profitability	   from	   M&As	  represents	  ǯunbiased	  assessment	  of	  the	  present	  value	  of	  the	  future	  benefits	  of	  M&As	  (King	  et	  al.,	  2004).	  The	  event	  study	  methodology	  rests	  on	  the	  Ǯǯintroduced	  by	  Fama	  et	  al.	  (1969)	  and	  Fama	  (1970).	  According	  to	  the	  original	  postulation,	  an	  efficient	  market	  is	   one	   in	  which	   stock	  prices	   fully	   reflect	   available	   information	  and	  which	  reacts	   on	   new	   information	   (events)	   regarding	   the	   expected	   returns	  (Liargovas	   &	   Repousis,	   2011).	   Event	   studies	   assess	   the	   success	   of	  transactions	   from	   the	   perspective	   of	   shareholder	   value	   by	   examining	   the	  unexpected	   or	   abnormal	   return	   to	   shareholders	   either	   across	   the	   deal	  sequence	  or	  in	  a	  longer	  timeframe	  (Napolitano,	  2003;	  Wübben,	  2007).	  	  	  The	  basic	  idea	  of	  bank	  consolidation	  event	  studies	  is	  to	  determine	  if	  there	  are	  any	  value	  gains	  in	  the	  share	  prices	  of	  the	  bidders	  and/or	  of	  the	  targets,	  and/or	  of	   the	  combined	  entities	  around	  the	  announcement	  of	  an	  M&A.	   In	  general,	  findings	  are	  not	  consistent	  across	  event	  studies,	  as	  demonstrated	  in	  the	   review	   article	   by	   Beitel	   and	   Schiereck	   (2000).	   The	   bulk	   of	   empirical	  research	   shows	   no	   evidence	   of	   value	   gains	   from	   bank	   mergers	   or	   from	  increased	   bank	   size	   per	   se	   beyond	   a	   small	   size.	   DeLong	   (2001),	   Becher	  (2000),	  Kane	  (2000),	  Beitel	  and	  Schiereck	  (2001),	  Hart	  and	  Apilado	  (2002),	  Campa	   and	   Hernando	   (2006),	   Becher	   (2006),	   Asimakopoulos	   and	  Athanasoglou	   (2009),	   and	   Intrisano	   (2012)	   studied	   abnormal	   returns	   of	  acquirers	   and	   they	   found	   that	   average	   cumulative	   abnormal	   returns	   of	  acquirers	  were	  negative	  around	  the	  merger	  announcement	  date.	  Studies	  by	  Hatzigayos	   et	   al.	   (2000),	   Cybo-­‐‑Ottone	   and	   Murgia	   (2000),	   Duso	   (2010),	  Liargovas	   and	   Repousis	   (2011),	   Dishad	   (2012),	   Goddard	   et	   al.	   (2012)	  present	   no	   significant	   value	   creation	   in	   the	   bidder	   share	   prices.	   Also	   of	  importance	   is	   the	   fact	   that	   only	   few	   studies	   offer	   statistically	   significant	  positive	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  acquiring	  banks	  as	  of	  Campa	  and	  Hernando	  (2004),	  and	  Davidson	  and	  Ismail	  (2005).	  Analysis	  of	  merger	  gains	  examining	  stock	   price	   performance	   of	   the	   bidder	   and	   target	   firm	   around	   the	  announcement	  of	  a	  merger	  or	  acquisition	  indicate	  that	  overall	  wealth	  effects	  from	  bank	  mergers	  are	  positive	  over	  time	  (Pillof,	  1996;	  Kwan	  &	  Eisenbeis,	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Research	  setting:	  the	  Greek	  banking	  sector	  	  In	  2012,	  the	  Greek	  banking	  sectors	  consisted	  of	  62	  credit	  institutions	  with	  4,005	  branches	  and	  63,400	  employees	  (EFB,	  2012).	  A	  particular	  feature	  of	  the	  Greek	  commercial	  banking	  system	  is	  the	  central	  role	  of	  a	  few	  large	  banks,	  having	  substantial	  market	  power	  (EFB,	  2012).	  Starting	  in	  1999	  a	  series	  of	  smaller-­‐‑sized	  bank	  M&As	  occurred.	  The	   leading	   role	  was	  held	  by	  Piraeus	  Bank,	  which	  acquired	  control	  of	  Chios	  Bank,	  founded	  in	  1991.	  In	  addition,	  Piraeus	   Bank	   absorbed	   the	   branches	   of	   National	   Westminster	   Bank	   in	  Greece.	  Shortly	  thereafter,	  Piraeus	  Bank	  moved	  on	  to	  absorb	  the	  commercial	  banks	  of	  Macedonia-­‐‑Thrace	  Bank	  and	  Chios	  respectively.	   In	  1999,	  Egnatia	  Bank	  absorbs	  the	  Bank	  of	  Central	  Greece.	  In	  the	  2000s,	  Egnatia	  Bank	  joins	  Cyprus	  Popular	  Bank	   to	   create	   the	  Marfin	  Popular	  Bank,	  which	   later	  was	  named	  Cyprus	  Popular	  Bank.	  In	  1998,	  two	  more	  historic	  banks	  disappeared	  from	  the	  bank	  charter,	  when	  the	  National	  Bank	  merged	  by	  absorption	  with	  National	  Mortgage	  Bank	  (which	  had	  been	  the	  outcome	  from	  the	  merger	  of	  two	  former	  subsidiaries,	  the	  National	  Mortgage	  and	  National	  Housing	  Bank).	  In	  early	  2002,	  Piraeus	  Bank	  acquired	  control	  ETBA	  bank,	  founded	  in	  1964	  with	   the	  main	  purpose	   to	  contribute	   to	   the	   industrial	  development	  of	   the	  country.	  	  	  After	   a	   lengthy	  period	  of	  more	  or	   less	   a	  decade,	  historical	   changes	   in	   the	  




	  The	  event	  study	  methodology	   is	  widely	  used	   to	   investigate	  possible	  gains	  that	  are	  derived	  from	  stock	  prices	  of	  the	  consolidated	  institutions	  involved	  prior	  and	  following	  the	  announcement	  of	  an	  M&A	  (Dilshad,	  2012).	  The	  first	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  step	   in	   an	   event	   study	   is	   to	   define	   the	   event	   under	   examination	   and	   the	  timing	   of	   the	   event,	   hence,	   the	   event	   date.	   In	   addition,	   it	   is	   necessary	   to	  identify	   the	   period	   over	   which	   the	   stock	   price	   performance	   will	   be	  investigated,	  the	  event	  window.	  Following	  the	  identification	  of	  the	  timing	  of	  the	  event,	  the	  event	  window	  should	  be	  determined	  [t1;	  t2],	  in	  other	  words,	  
ǡǯstock	  price	  performance	  is	  under	  examination.	  We	  follow	  Warner	  and	  Brown	  (1985)	  in	  order	  to	  investigate	  market	  reactions	  to	  bank	  mergers	  taking	  place	  in	  Greece	  during	  1997-­‐‑2013,	  where	  differences	  in	  the	  stock	  returns	  between	  acquiring	  banks	   or	   target	   banks	   and	   the	  market	   are	   used	   as	   estimates	  of	  abnormal	   or	   excess	   returns	   for	   a	   12-­‐‑day	   window	   [-­‐‑10;	   +1]	   around	   the	  merger	  announcement	  date,	  using	  the	  following	  model:	  	  
ARit	  =	  Rit	  Ȃ	  (ai	  +	  biRmt)	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (equation	  1)	  where	  
ARit	   =	  abnormal	  returns	  to	  bank	  stock	  i	  at	  time	  t	  	  
Ru	  	   =	  actual	  returns	  to	  bank	  stock	  i	  at	  time	  t	  
ai	  	   =	  ordinary	  least	  squares	  (OLS)	  estimate	  of	  the	  intercept	  of	  the	  estimated	  market	  model	  
bi	  	   =	  OLS	  estimate	  of	  the	  market	  model	  slope	  coefficient	  reflecting	  change	  in	  the	  market	  return	  relative	  to	  the	  return	  for	  bank	  i	  








¦ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  (equation	  2)	  	  where	  t	  =	  -­‐‑10,-­‐‑ͻǥͲǡΪͳǤ-­‐‑sectional	  average	  neutralizes	  firm-­‐‑specific	  price	  variations	  that	  are	  unrelated	  to	  the	  merger	  announcements	  because	  each	  announcement	  did	  not	  occur	  at	  the	  same	  point	  in	  time	  for	  the	  n	  banks	  in	  the	  sample.	  Hence,	  the	  expected	  value	  of	  MARt	   is	  zero	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  abnormal	   returns	   due	   to	  merger	   announcements.	   The	   final	   calculation	   of	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  (equation	  3)	  
where	   t1	   =	   {0,	   +1},	   and	  

CAR(10,t1)	   is	   the	   cumulative	   average	   abnormal	  return	  for	  the	  sample	  of	  n	  bank	  stocks	  over	  the	  event	  period	  intervals	  from	  t	  =	  -­‐‑10	  to	  t	  =	  t1.	  The	  expected	  value	  of	  CAR	  is	  zero	  in	  the	  absence	  of	  abnormal	  returns.	  	  
Statistical	  analysis	  























2	  	  	  =	  residual	  variance	  for	  security	  i	  from	  the	  market	  model	  regression	  
T	  	  	  	  =	  number	  of	  days	  in	  the	  estimation	  period	  (135)	  
Rmt	  =	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  the	  market	  index	  for	  day	  t	  of	  the	  event	  period	  
Rm	  	  =	  mean	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  the	  market	  index	  during	  the	  estimation	  period	  
Rmk	  =	  rate	  of	  return	  on	  the	  market	  index	  for	  the	  day	  k	  of	  the	  estimation	  period	  	  As	   shown	   in	   equation	   5,	   the	   standard	   error	   of	   the	   forecast	   for	   the	   event	  period,	   sit,	   involves	   a	   slight	   adjustment	   from	   the	   standard	   error	   of	   the	  estimate,	   si.	   This	   adjustment	   reflects	   the	   deviations	   of	   the	   independent	  variables	  in	  the	  estimation	  period	  from	  the	  values	  employed	  in	  the	  original	  regression	  and	  are	  typically	  close	  to	  1.	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Statistical	  analysis	  of	  the	  combined	  entity	  
	  Most	   studies	   examine	   the	   abnormal	   returns	   of	   acquirers	   and	   targets	  separately,	   but	   several	   papers	   analyse	   the	   total	   change	   in	   shareholder	  wealth.	   In	   such	   cases,	   the	   value-­‐‑weighted	   sum	   of	   acquirer	   and	   target	  abnormal	  returns	  is	  the	  appropriate	  measure	  of	  overall	  gains	  stemming	  from	  merger	  and	  acquisition	  activity.	  This	  measure	  quantifies	  the	  value	  reaction	  that	   the	   market	   believes	   the	   merger	   will	   provide	   because	   false	  interpretations	   can	   be	  made	  when	   looking	   solely	   at	   the	   outcomes	   of	   the	  bidder	  or	  the	  target.	  Cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  of	   the	  combined	  entity	  (bidder	  and	  target	   firms	  together)	  are	  calculated	  by	  following	  the	  method	  outline	  in	  Houston	  and	  Ryngaert	  (1994)	  	  	  Combined	  Cumulative	  Abnormal	  Returns	  =	  	  	  	  	  where	   Vi	        ǯ  Ȃ10	   days	   before	   the	   merger	  announcement	  date	  for	  the	  bidder	  and	  target	  respectively	  over	  the	  12-­‐‑day	  window.	  To	  gauge	  statistical	  significance,	  a	  z-­‐‑test	  and	  subsequent	  p-­‐‑value	  are	   calculated	   from	   the	   mean	   assuming	   a	   normal	   distribution	   using	   the	  suggestions	  described	  in	  Dodd	  &	  Warner	  (1983).	  	  
M&A	  data	  sources	  and	  sample	  selection	  criteria	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There	  were	  thirty	  three	  (33)	  bank	  mergers	  during	  the	  period	  1996-­‐‑2013	  in	  Greece,	  but	  nineteen	  mergers	  (19)	  were	  eliminated	  from	  the	  sample,	  as	  they	  did	  not	  satisfy	  the	  following	  criteria:	  
x Both,	   the	   bidding	   and	   the	   target	   banks	   are	   publicly	   traded	   banking	  institutions	  listed	  on	  the	  Athens	  Stock	  Exchange	  (ASE)	  for	  at	  least	  252	  trading	  days	  (a	  full	  year)	  prior	  to	  the	  announcement	  and	  20	  days	  after	  the	  announcement	  of	  a	  merger	  transaction.	  
x The	  merger	  or	  acquisition	  must	  have	  occurred	  before	  31/7/2013.	  
x Both	  of	  the	  merged	  banks	  must	  be	  healthy	  institutions	  at	  the	  time	  of	  the	  merger.	  
x The	  transaction	  has	  been	  closed	  Ȃ	  the	  deal	  status	  hence	  is	  ǲǳǤ	  
x The	  M&A	  deal	  is	  a	  full	  merger	  of	  the	  two	  banks	  or	  entails	  the	  transfer	  of	  control	  from	  the	  target	  to	  the	  acquiring	  bank.	  	  In	   particular,	   in	   sixteen	   (16)	   cases	   the	   bidding	   or	   target	   banks	  were	   not	  publicly	  traded	  banking	  institutions,	  which	  means	  that	  there	  were	  no	  share	  prices	   to	  perform	  event	   study	  methodology	   and	   in	   three	   (3)	  cases,	  Greek	  banks	  involved	  in	  the	  take-­‐‑over	  of	  network	  of	  foreign	  banks).	  So,	  following	  the	  elimination,	  the	  total	  number	  of	  deals	  left	  for	  analysis	  is	  fourteen	  (14).	  The	  final	  sample	  of	  the	  study	  is	  presented	  in	  Table	  1.	  	  
Table	  1.1996-­‐‑2013	  Greek	  bank	  M&As	  
Year	   Acquiring	  Bank	   Target	  Bank	   Announcement	  
Date	  1997	   National	  Mortage	   National	  Housing	   31/01/1997	  1998	   Piraeus	  Bank	   Macedonia-­‐‑Thrace	  Bank	   08/05/1998	  Piraeus	  Bank	   Xiosbank	   10/07/1998	  EFG	  Eurobank	   Bank	  of	  Athens	   16/06/1998	  Egnatia	  Bank	   Bank	  of	  Central	  Greece	   31/07/1998	  National	  Bank	  of	  Greece	   National	  Mortage	   27/05/1998	  2011	   Postal	  Savings	  Bank	   Aspis	  Bank	   09/0602011	  2012	   Piraeus	  Bank	   Geniki	  Bank	   19/10/2012	  Alpha	  Bank	   	   Commercial	  Bank	   16/10/2012	  Piraeus	  	   Agricultural	  Bank	   23/09/2012	  2013	   Piraeus	  Bank	   Bank	  of	  Cyprus	   03/03/2013	  Piraeus	  Bank	   Laiki	  Bank	   03/03/2013	  EFG	  Eurobank-­‐‑Ergasias	   Postal	  Savings	  Bank	   14/07/2013	  EFG	  Eurobank-­‐‑Ergasias	   Proton	  Bank	   19/07/2013	  
	  
328	  |	  Anastasios	  KARAMANOS,	  George	  BAKATSELOS,	  Roena	  AGOLLI	  Abnormal	  Stock	  Market	  Returns	  to	  Announcements	  of	  M&A	  Banking	  Deals	  In	  Greece	  1996-­‐‑2013	  
	   	  
Results	  
	  
Market	  responses	  to	  mergers	  
	  Following	  the	  methodology	  outlined	  in	  the	  previous	  section,	  several	  event	  windows	  are	  used	  to	  calculate	  abnormal	  returns	  ranging	  in	  size	  from	  twelve	  days,	   spanning	  days	   [t	  =	   -­‐‑10,	   t	  =	  +1]	   to	  only	   two	  days	   [t	  =	  0,	  +1].	  Table	  2	  provides	  the	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  bidders.	  In	  general,	  prior	  to	  the	  merger	  announcement	  date,	  bidders	  experience	  positive	  returns.	  Over	  the	  11-­‐‑day	  window	  [-­‐‑10;0],	  bidder	  CARs	  are	  accounted	  for	  +1,74%,	  while	  the	  3-­‐‑day	   window	   [-­‐‑2;0]	   offers	   +2,54%	   gains	   for	   the	   shareholders	   of	   the	  acquiring	   firms.	   However,	   this	   trend	   seems	   to	   be	   altered	   exactly	   on	   the	  announcement	  date	  where	  bidder	  abnormal	  returns	  fall	  significantly.	  This	  is	  very	  clear	  in	  the	  2-­‐‑day	  event	  window	  [0;+1],	  where	  the	  losses	  for	  bidders	  reach	  Ȃ1,74%.	  Overall,	  this	  study	  finds	  positive	  and	  statistically	  insignificant	  abnormal	  returns	  to	  acquiring	  firms	  amounting	  to	  a	  twelve-­‐‑day	  cumulative	  abnormal	   return	   of	   only	   +0,78%,	   a	   very	   modest	   average	   gain.	   One	  explanation	  for	  this	  slight	  increase	  in	  returns	  for	  acquiring	  banks	  is	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  considerable	  size	  of	  target	  banks	  in	  Greece	  along	  with	  their	  strong	  financial	  performance	  do	  not	  allow	  bidding	  firms	  to	  exploit	  any	  significant	  gains	  from	  efficiency	  increase	  and	  cost	  savings.	  	  	  However,	  the	  results	  validate	  the	  results	  of	  Liagrovas	  and	  Repousis	  (2011)	  who	  also	   report	   insignificant	  bidder	  CARs	   for	  an	  event	  window	  [-­‐‑30;+30]	  and	  are	  not	  seriously	  differentiated	  with	  these	  of	  an	  earlier	  event	  study	  by	  Hatzigayos	  et	  al.	  (2000).	  Their	  findings	  indicate	  that	  there	  is	  an	  insignificant	  negative	   reaction	   for	   shareholders	   of	   the	   acquiring	   firms	   around	   the	  announcement	   of	   a	   bank	   merger	   in	   Greece.	   The	   authors	   find	   a	   non-­‐‑significant	   negative	   reaction	   of	   Ȃ0,3%	   on	   days	   Ȃ1	   to	   +5	   after	   the	  announcement	   date.	   Nevertheless,	   the	   sample	   used	   in	   their	   work	   is	  somewhat	  smaller	   than	  that	  used	  in	   this	  study	  and	  the	  authors	  computed	  abnormal	  returns	  only	  for	  the	  bidders.	  However,	  both	  studies	  of	  Mylonidis	  and	  Kelnikola	  (2005),	  and	  Asimakopoulos	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  disclose	  considerable	  wealth	   effects	   for	   bidders	   at	   4,9%	  and	   25,1%	   respectively	   over	   a	   40-­‐‑day	  window	  [-­‐‑20;	  +20].	  It	  is	  worth	  noticing	  that	  Asimakopoulos	  et	  al.	  (2005)	  is	  the	   only	  Greek	   study	   that	   shows	   significantly	   higher	   CARs	   for	   bidders	   as	  compared	  to	  the	  CARs	  of	  targets	  for	  a	  considerable	  period	  of	  time	  violating	  the	  efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  and	  giving	  space	  to	  rumor	  dispersion	  effect	  and	  or	   to	   abuse	  of	   inside	   information	  prior	   the	   announcement	  of	  merger	  event.	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Table	  2.	  Cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  (CARs)	  of	  the	  acquiring	  banks	  in	  Greece	  
in	  1996-­‐‑2013	  
Note:	  This	   table	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   an	   event	   study	   examining	  14	   targets	   from	  
Greek	   bank	   M&As.	   Abnormal	   returns	   were	   calculated	   using	   OLS-­‐‑regression.	   OLS	  
parameters	  have	  been	  estimated	  for	  a	  period	  of	  135	  trading	  days	  prior	  to	  the	  event	  
window	  [-­‐‑10;+1].	  As	  market	  returns	  we	  applied	  ASE	  index	  (Athens	  Stock	  Exchange).	  
Tests	  of	   significance	  are	  calculated	   from	  standardized	  abnormal	  returns	  employing	  
the	  Dodd-­‐‑Warner	  (1983)	  procedure.	  
a	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1	   percent	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5	   percent	   level,	  
*=significant	  at	  10	  percent	  level.	  	  Other	  previous	  European	  studies	  that	  look	  at	  the	  returns	  to	  bidders	  report	  insignificant	  findings	  for	  the	  shareholders	  of	  the	  acquiring	  firms.	  The	  results	  of	   Dishlad	   (2012),	   Goddard	   et	   al.	   (2012),	   Duso	   (2010),	   Cybo-­‐‑Ottone	   and	  Murgia	  (2000),	  Beitel	  and	  Shierech	  (2004),	  and	  Tourani-­‐‑Rad	  and	  Van	  Beek	  (1999)	  are	  basically	  the	  same.	  However,	  studies	  focusing	  on	   the	  US	  M&As	  indicate	  significant	  negative	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns.	  Becher	  (2006),	  and	  Hart	  and	  Apilado	  (2002)	  show	  -­‐‑0,61%	  and	  Ȃ0,63%	  losses	  respectively	  for	  a	  one-­‐‑day	  event	  window	  [0].	   In	  addition,	  DeLong	  (2001)	  finds	  Ȃ1,70%	  return	  for	  a	  twelve-­‐‑day	  window	  [-­‐‑10;	  +1],	  while	  Houston	  et	  al.	  (2001)	  report	  
Ȃ2,61%	  return	  for	  acquiring	  firms.	  European	  studies	  that	  also	  conclude	  to	  negative	   bidder	   CARs	   are	   that	   of	   Intrisano	   (2012)	   finding	   -­‐‑3,7%,	  Asimakopoulos	   and	   Athanasoglou	   (2009)	   -­‐‑0,79%,	   Campa	   and	   Hernando	  (2006)	  -­‐‑2,37%	  The	  findings	  for	  the	  bidders	  in	  this	  study	  seem	  to	  contradict	  the	   findings	   of	   major	   US	   studies,	   while	   tend	   to	   confirm	   several	   studies	  conducted	   on	   European	   banking	   markets	   indicating	   neither	   success	   nor	  failure	  of	  wealth	  creation	  for	  the	  shareholders	  of	  acquiring	  banks.	  	  Cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  targets	  across	  event	  windows	  are	  reported	  in	   Table	   3.	   There	   is	   no	  much	   to	   say	   about	   target	   returns.	   Like	   previous	  European	  and	  US	  studies,	  target	  banks	  in	  Greece	  have	  positive	  wealth	  effects	  in	   all	   event	  windows.	  As	   can	  be	  noted	  observing	  p-­‐‑value	  of	   the	   z-­‐‑test,	   all	  measures	   of	   CARs	   are	   highly	   significant.	   This	   work	   finds	   a	   statistically	  significant	  cumulative	  return	  +7,44%	  for	  the	  event	  window	  [-­‐‑10;+1].	  	  
Bidders	  (N	  =	  7)	  
Event	  window	  
	  








p-­‐‑value	  [-­‐‑10;0]	   1,74	   4	   4	   0,01	   0,25477	  [-­‐‑5;0]	   1,88	   3	   5	   0,03	   0,19548	  [-­‐‑2;0]	   2,54	   5	   3	   0,04	   0,20358	  [-­‐‑1;0]	   0,08	   4	   4	   0,25	   0,22571	  {0}	   -­‐‑0,78	   2	   6	   0,50	   0,11929	  [-­‐‑1;+1]	   -­‐‑0,88	   4	   4	   0,22	   0,11271	  [0;+1]	   -­‐‑1,74	   4	   4	   0,47	   0,29943	  [-­‐‑10;+1]	   0,78	   3	   5	   0,31	   0,33732	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Table	  3.	  Cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  (CARs)	  of	  targeted	  banks	  in	  Greece	  in	  
1996-­‐‑2013	  
Targets	  (N	  =	  14)	  
Event	  window	  
	  








p-­‐‑value	  [-­‐‑10;0]	   5,43***	   5	   3	   0,96	   0,00000	  [-­‐‑5;0]	   3,76***	   4	   4	   0,86	   0,00000	  [-­‐‑2;0]	   4,54***	   6	   2	   0,29	   0,00000	  [-­‐‑1;0]	   	   2,72***	   4	   4	   0,39	   0,00000	  {0}	   1,14***	   3	   5	   0,50	   0,00000	  [-­‐‑1;+1]	   4,73***	   3	   5	   0,72	   0,00000	  [0;+1]	   3,15***	   4	   4	   0,67	   0,00000	  [-­‐‑10;+1]	   7,44***	   5	   3	   0,58	   0,00000	  
Notes:	  This	   table	   presents	   the	   results	   for	   an	   event	   study	   examining	  7	   bidders	   from	  
Greek	   bank	   M&As.	   Abnormal	   returns	   were	   calculated	   using	   OLS-­‐‑regression.	   OLS	  
parameters	  have	  been	  estimated	  for	  a	  period	  of	  135	  trading	  days	  prior	  to	  the	  event	  
window	  [-­‐‑10;+1].	  As	  market	  returns	  we	  applied	  ASE	  index	  (Athens	  Stock	  Exchange).	  
Tests	  of	   significance	  are	  calculated	   from	  standardized	  abnormal	  returns	  employing	  
the	  Dodd-­‐‑Warner	  (1983)	  procedure.	  
a	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1	   percent	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5	   percent	   level,	  
*=significant	  at	  10	  percent	  level.	  	  The	   results	   of	   the	   present	   study	   indeed	   confirm	   the	   outcomes	   of	   similar	  Greek	  studies	  such	  as	  those	  of	  Mylonidis	  and	  Kelnikola	  (2005)	  as	  well	  that	  of	  Asimakopoulos	  et	  al.	   (2005).	  According	   to	  Beitel	  and	  Schiereck	  (2004),	   in	  Europe,	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  targets	  account	  for	  +16,0%	  in	  a	  41-­‐‑day	   window	   [-­‐‑20;+20].	   The	   results	   of	   Intrisano	   (2012)	   represent	   10.3%	  wealth	   creation	   for	   targets.	   Cybo-­‐‑Ottone	   and	  Murgia	   (2000)	   also	   register	  significant	  positive	  returns	  +16,1%	  for	  target	  banks	  considering	  the	  period	  of	   11	   days	   around	   the	   announcement,	   while	   Tourani-­‐‑Rad	   and	   Van	   Beek	  (1999)	  show	  +5,71%	  wealth	  increase	  in	  a	  81-­‐‑day	  event	  window	  [-­‐‑40;+40].	  The	  same	  results	  are	  found	  in	  all	  studies	  performed	  in	  the	  US	  too.	  Targets	  experience	  superior	  performance	  regardless	  of	  the	  days	  studied	  in	  the	  event	  windows	  (Hart	  &	  Apilado,	  2002;	  DeLong,	  2001).	   In	  other	  words,	  M&As	   in	  Europe	   and	   the	   US	       ǯ Ǥ  suggests	  that	  target	  management	  and	  shareholders	  may	  prefer	  to	  withdraw	  from	  deals	  where	   there	  are	  no	  significant	  opportunities	   to	  exploit	  merger	  gains.	  	  	  	  	  	  The	  results	  of	  the	  event	  study	  for	  the	  combined	  entity	  are	  given	  in	  Table	  4.	  Examining	  simultaneously	  both	  the	  acquiring	  and	  targeted	  banks,	  allows	  us	  to	  determine	  whether	  bank	  M&As	  create	  rather	  than	  transfer	  wealth.	  The	  market	   reaction	   for	   the	   combined	   entity	   to	   a	   merger	   announcement	   for	  several	  days	  surrounding	  the	  merger	  announcement	  shows	  a	  slight	  increase	  in	   the	   combined	  abnormal	   returns	   for	  14	  pairs	  of	   acquiring	   and	   targeted	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banks	   in	  sample.	  Table	  4	   indicates	   that	  over	   the	  11-­‐‑day	  window	  [-­‐‑10;+1],	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  to	  the	  combined	  entity	  are	  +2,91%.	  Positive	  returns	  to	  targets	  are	  essentially	  offset	  by	  insignificant	  returns	  to	  bidders.	  It	  is	  interesting	  to	  note,	  however,	  that	  this	  result	  is	  consistent	  with	  accounting-­‐‑based	  studies	  that	  provide	  evidence	  for	  limited	  efficiency	  gains	  from	  bank	  mergers	  (Duso,	  2010;	  Davinson	  &	  Ismail,	  2005;	  Hart	  &	  Apilado,	  2002;	  Kwan	  &	  Eisenbeis,1999;	  Pillof,	  1996).	  However,	  Mylonidis	  and	  Kelnikola	  (2005)	  register	  a	  quite	  big	  CAR	  +9,1%,	  while	  Vergos	  and	  Christopoulos	  (2008)	  +6%	  respectively	  regarding	  Greek	  deals.	  When	  comparing	  the	  results	  of	  this	  study	  with	   those	   reported	   in	   Table	   3.1,	   Cybo-­‐‑Ottone	   and	   Murgia	   (2000)	   finds	  +4,0%	  increase	  in	  the	  market	  value	  for	  the	  combined	  entity	  in	  a	  sample	  of	  46	  European	  bank	  mergers.	   	  
Table	  4.	  Combined	  cumulative	  abnormal	  returns	  (CARs)	  from	  bank	  takeovers	  
in	  Greece	  in	  1996-­‐‑2013	  
Combined	  entity	  (N	  =	  14)	  
Event	  window	  
	  








p-­‐‑value	  [-­‐‑10;0]	   1,10***	   5	   3	   0,30	   0,00056	  [-­‐‑5;0]	   0,24***	   4	   4	   0,22	   0,00099	  [-­‐‑2;0]	   1,08***	   6	   2	   0,04	   0,00268	  [-­‐‑1;0]	   	   0,85***	   4	   4	   0,23	   0,00044	  {0}	   0,44***	   3	   5	   0,50	   0,00003	  [-­‐‑1;+1]	   2,42***	   3	   5	   0,42	   0,00011	  [0;+1]	   1,15***	   6	   2	   0,58	   0,00005	  [-­‐‑10;+1]	   2,91***	   3	   5	   0,29	   0,00413	  
Notes:	  This	  table	  presents	  the	  results	  for	  an	  event	  study	  examining	  8	  targets	  from	  Greek	  
bank	  M&As.	  Abnormal	  returns	  were	  calculated	  using	  OLS-­‐‑regression.	  OLS	  parameters	  
have	  been	  estimated	   for	  a	  period	  of	  135	   trading	  days	  prior	   to	   the	  event	  window	   [-­‐‑
10;+1].	   As	  market	   returns	  we	   applied	   ASE	   index	   (Athens	   Stock	   Exchange).	   Tests	   of	  
significance	  are	  calculated	  from	  standardized	  abnormal	  returns	  employing	  the	  Dodd-­‐‑
Warner	  (1983)	  procedure.	  
a	   ***=significant	   at	   the	   1	   percent	   level,	   **=significant	   at	   the	   5	   percent	   level,	  
*=significant	  at	  10	  percent	  level.	  	  Beitel	  and	  Schiereck	  (2004)	  also	  studied	  mergers	  in	  Europe,	  show	  +1,29%	  increase	  in	  combined	  value.	  Studies	  on	  the	  wealth	  effects	  of	  US	  bank	  M&As,	  such	   as	   those	   of	   Houston	   et	   al.	   (2001),	   Becher	   (2000),	   and	   Houston	   and	  Ryngaert	   (1994)	   find	   that	   mergers	   can	   create	   little	   value	   on	   a	   net	   and	  aggregate	   basis.	   According	   to	   the	   aforementioned	   studies,	   this	   work	   is	  consistent	   with	   actual	   measured	   performance	   gains	   and	   the	   bulk	   of	  European	  and	  US	  event	  studies.	  For	  a	  more	  complete	  picture	  of	   the	  CARs	  during	  the	  investigation	  period	  for	  the	  bidders,	  the	  targets	  as	  well	  as	  for	  the	  combined	  entity,	  see	  Figure	  1.	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Figure	  1.	  CARs	  for	  the	  whole	  sample	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economic	   value	   created	   by	   M&A	   is	   distributed	   in	   the	   form	   of	   abnormal	  returns	   to	   the	   shareholders	   of	   the	   acquired	   firm.	   The	   empirical	   evidence	  affirms	   the	   perfectly	   competitive	   corporate	   control	   market	   in	   Greece,	   in	  which	   private,	   uniquely	   valuable	   and	   inimitable	   cash	   flows	   cannot	   exist	  between	   bidders	   and	   targetǤ     Ǯ-­‐‑ ǯ efficient	  market	  hypothesis	  of	  the	  Athens	  Stock	  Exchange.	  According	  to	  the	  semi-­‐‑strong	   efficiency	   argument,	   no	   investor	   can	   earn	   above-­‐‑average	  returns	   from	   trading	   rules	   based	   on	   historical	   and	   public	   available	  information	  (Wübben,	  2007).	  	  	  As	  several	  Greek	  event	  studies	  have	  found	  significant	  abnormal	  returns	  for	  both	  bidding	  and	  target	  banks,	  a	  query	  is	  raised	  on	  whether	  the	  market	  is	  a	  
Ƭǯperformance	  or	  M&Asǯ	  a	  determinant	  of	   the	  market.	   For	   a	   small	  market	   like	   Greece,	   the	   quandary	   resolves	   by	  observing	   the	  different	   results	   on	  wealth	   gains	  of	   bank	  M&As.	  Manasakis	  (2009),	  Mylonidis	   and	  Kelnikola	   (2005),	   and	  Asimakopoulos	  et	  al.	   (2005)	  found	   considerable	   wealth	   gains	   for	   both	   acquirers	   and	   targets	   of	   bank	  consolidations	  in	  Greece.	  The	  likelihood	  then	  is	  that	  the	  dealmakers	  studied	  exhaustively	   the	   strategic	   relatedness	   between	   bidder	   and	   target,	   and	  programmed	  uniquely	  valuable	  cash	   flows	  between	  the	  acquiring	  and	   the	  acquired	   bank,	   challenging	   the	   perfectly	   competitive	   corporate	   control	  market	  of	  Greece	  Ȃ	  something	  not	  very	  unusual	  in	  a	  banking	  system	  which	  is	  organized	  as	  a	  system	  of	  national	  oligopoly.	  This	   is	  not	  noticed	   in	  a	   large	  banking	  system,	  as	  that	  of	  the	  US,	  where	  the	  bulk	  of	  event	  studies	  reports	  insignificant	  abnormal	  gains	  for	  acquiring	  banks.	  If	  this	  is	  the	  case,	  then	  the	  wealth	   gains	   of	   bank	   M&As	   in	   Greece	   over	   the	   period	   1996-­‐‑2013	   are	  penalized	  by	  poor	  strategic	  relatedness	  between	  bidders	  and	  targets.	  	  Otherwise,	  acquiring	  managers	  are	  experiencing	  a	  kind	  of	  self-­‐‑delusion,	  as	  Doukas	  and	  Petmezas	  (2007)	  stress	  out	  that	  optimism	  and	  overconfidence	  
  ǯ      Ǯǯ    misperceived	  ability	   that	  managers	   can	   improve	   the	   target.	  The	  hubris	  of	  corporate	  takeovers	  is	  extensively	  used	  as	  a	  palatable	  argument	  for	  wealth	  effects	  of	  bank	  M&As	  internationally.	  However,	  it	  is	  still	  difficult	  to	  consider	  that	   a	   vast	   restructuring	   of	   the	   world	   financial	   structure	   is	   taking	   place	  
ǯtalent.	  Another	  possible	  explanation	  rests	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  managers	  are	  unethical.	  As	  the	  result	  of	  expense	  preference	  approach,	  they	  inform	  the	  shareholders	  that	  their	  only	  purpose	  is	  the	  value	  creation;	  nevertheless	  they	  are	  only	   taking	  care	   to	   increase	   their	  own	  power	  base	  and	  compensation.	  Still,	  regarding	  this	  issue,	  someone	  must	  be	  really	  skeptical	  to	  claim	  that	  big	  banking	   institutions	  have	  undertaken	   considerable	   acquisition	  plans	  with	  the	  consent	  of	  shareholders	  that	  do	  not	  benefit	  from	  the	  exercise.	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  Limitations	  of	  the	  study	  	  
	  As	  with	   any	  methodological	   approach,	   shareholder	   value	   creation	   studies	  themselves	   are	   not	   perfect.	   A	   well-­‐‑known	   weakness	   of	   accounting	   data	  studies	  is	  the	  definition	  of	  inputs	  and	  outputs	  of	  a	  banking	  firm,	  meaning	  that	  there	  is	  lack	  of	  consensus	  on	  the	  variables	  that	  entirely	  define	  bank	  output.	  Another	   significant	   drawback	   is	   the	   regular	   phenomenon	   of	   misleading	  manipulated	   accounting	   data	   (Liargovas	   &	   Repousis,	   2011).	   Likewise,	   a	  drawback	  with	  event	  studies	  is	  that	   the	  origin	  of	  any	  value	  creation	  is	  not	  effortlessly	   traced,	   therefore,	  must	  be	  determined	  out	  of	   the	  data	  using	   a	  second-­‐‑stage	  statistical	  procedure,	   for	  instance,	  positive	  abnormal	  returns	  could	  be	   interpreted	  as	   the	  outcome	  of	  either	   increased	  market	  power	  or	  improved	   efficiency	   or	   both.	   In	   other	   words,	   observed	   returns	   may	   be	  ascribed	  to	  expected	  bank	  performance	  or	  the	  actual	  result	  may	  be	  entirely	  unrelated	  to	  the	  surveyed	  merger	  transaction.	  Nonetheless,	  the	  event	  study	  methodology	  is	  not	  left	  without	  criticism.	  Becher	  (2006)	  claims	  that	  event	  windows	  are	  not	  easy	  to	  trace	  and	  are	  regularly	  stringently	  characterized	  as	  the	  market	  anticipates	  mergers	  before	  they	  are	  actually	  announced	  publicly.	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